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INTRODUCTION 
 We expect that no reader is surprised to learn that “so many eager and ex-
cited first-year law students become jaded and apathetic by the time they grad-
uate from law school.”1 Students’ “early curiosity about law as a tool to engage 
pressing social issues fades as they become both disillusioned and passive over 
the course of their law school experience.”2 Similarly, no one is surprised to 
learn that these problems are exacerbated by legal educators who often dismiss 
as irrelevant the students’ “moral concerns or compassion for the people in the 
cases they discuss,”3 leading others to focus on law schools—and the standard 
model of legal education—as the most important cause of cynicism and disillu-
sionment in young lawyers.4 The traditional law school curriculum’s emphasis 
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1  Robin Wellford Slocum, An Inconvenient Truth: The Need to Educate Emotionally Com-
petent Lawyers, 45 CREIGHTON L. REV. 827, 828 (2012). 
2  Susan Sturm, Commentary, Reaction: Law Schools, Leadership, and Change, 127 HARV. 
L. REV. F. 49, 51 (2013). 
3  Slocum, supra note 1, at 839 n.59 (quoting WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., CARNEGIE 
FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE 
PROFESSION OF LAW 187 (2007)). 
4  Benjamin H. Barton, The ABA, the Rules, and Professionalism: The Mechanics of Self-
Defeat and a Call for a Return to the Ethical, Moral, and Practical Approach of the Canons, 
83 N.C. L. REV. 411, 443–44 (2005) (citing, inter alia, Susan Daicoff, Lawyer Know Thyself: 
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on rules and analysis “erodes [students’ pre-existing] sense of purpose, leaving 
many . . . disillusioned and disengaged.”5 As Stephen Siptroth has elegantly 
said, “the soul of the law student atrophies, withers, and disappears in a fog of 
dysfunction.”6 
 There is powerful evidence that legal education is overtly “harmful to the 
emotional and psychological well-being of many law students.”7 Certainly, 
there is no disputing the research that the “incidence of clinically diagnosable 
depression among law students is much higher than among the general popula-
tion.”8  
Within a few months of entering law school, students begin to display signifi-
cant symptoms indicating that the demands of school are taxing their adaptive 
capacity. . . . Students also report extreme self-punishing attitudes, obsessive 
self-doubt, apathy, withdrawal from normal activities, fear, apprehension, a 
sense of impending doom, and panic attacks.9  
Of course, these symptoms make learning more difficult. High levels of anxiety 
can interfere with memory and assimilation of material, making study diffi-
cult.10 Additionally, “thoughts and moods associated with depression and anx-
iety often are associated with behavioral avoidance—in this case, of law school 
                                                                                                                                 
A Review of Empirical Research on Attorney Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 AM. 
U. L. REV. 1337, 1386–87 & nn. 293–301 (1997); Ruta K. Stropus, Mend It, Bend It, and 
Extend It: The Fate of Traditional Law School Methodology in the 21st Century, 27 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 449, 455–65 (1996)). For a personal account, see RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, 
BROKEN CONTRACT: A MEMOIR OF HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 236–38 (1999) (discussing how 
Harvard Law School stripped the author of his idealism and commitment to social justice). 
5  Margaret Meriwether Cordray, Expanding Pro Bono’s Role in Legal Education, 48 IDAHO 
L. REV. 29, 36 (2011) (citing SUSAN SWAIM DAICOFF, LAWYER KNOW THYSELF 76–77 
(2004)). 
6  Stephen M. Siptroth, Note, Forming the Human Person: Can the Seminary Model Save the 
Legal Profession?, 2007 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 181, 181 (2007). 
7  Cordray, supra note 5, at 36 n.25 (quoting ROY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR 
LEGAL EDUCATION: A VISION AND A ROADMAP 29–36 (2007)). 
8  Michael H. Hoeflich, Legal Ethics and Depression, 74 J. KAN. B. ASS’N, Sept. 2005, at 33, 
34 (citing G. Andrew H. Benjamin et al., The Prevalence of Depression, Alcohol Abuse, and 
Cocaine Abuse Among United States Lawyers, 13 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 233, 234 
(1990)). 
9  Suzanne C. Segerstrom, Perceptions of Stress and Control in the First Semester of Law 
School, 32 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 593, 594 (1996) (footnotes omitted) (citing, inter alia, G. 
Andrew H. Benjamin et al., The Role of Legal Education in Producing Psychological Dis-
tress Among Law Students and Lawyers, AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 225, 240, 247 (1986); Phyllis 
W. Beck & David Burns, Anxiety and Depression in Law Students: Cognitive Intervention, 
30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 270, 274–75, 276 (1979)). 
10  See Matthew Owens et al., Anxiety and Depression in Academic Performance: An Explo-
ration of the Mediating Factors of Worry and Working Memory, 33 SCH. PSYCHOL. INT’L 
433, 433 (2012) (“Higher levels of anxiety and depression were associated with lower aca-
demic performance” for students in a variety of testing environments that relied on 
knowledge retention); see also Matthew Owens et al., When Does Anxiety Help or Hinder 
Cognitive Test Performance? The Role of Working Memory Capacity, 105 BRITISH J. 
PSYCHOL. 92, 92 (2014) (“Cognitive interference theories . . . suggest that high levels of trait 
anxiety predict adverse effects on the performance of cognitive tasks . . . .”). 
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itself.”11 It is no wonder “some evidence suggests that rates of clinical depres-
sion and of alcohol and substance abuse rise regularly while students continue 
their legal education.”12 
 And there is more. Classes that are not “mainstream,” such as private law 
and business-related courses, are referred to derisively as being about “law and 
bananas,”13 and are characterized as “esoteric fluff largely irrelevant to prac-
tice.”14 In a free-swinging attack on interdisciplinary education, Professor Ar-
thur Austin sneered that he had “serious doubts about law professors possessing 
sufficient knowledge of the banana material to compose a credible syllabus” for 
a course.15 There is no question in our minds that this attitude is causally con-
nected to the senses of anomie and misery felt by so many law students, as re-
flected in the research referred to above. 
 This gloom notwithstanding, the authors remain optimistic. We believe that 
there is a way out of this morass, a way that one of us (MLP) has used as a 
teacher (and that AJL, who was MLP’s student before she became his co-
author and colleague, absorbed as a student). This way incorporates principles 
of therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ) into our teaching, our writing, and our law 
practice, in many areas of law, not just in mental disability law (where TJ be-
gan).16 We believe that the act of teaching TJ can be a tool of social justice, and 
                                                        
11  Segerstrom, supra note 9, at 595 n.20 (citing B.A. Glesner, Fear and Loathing in the Law 
Schools, 23 CONN. L. REV. 627, 636–37 (1991)). 
12  Michael L. Perlin, “Baby, Look Inside Your Mirror”: The Legal Profession’s Willful and 
Sanist Blindness to Lawyers with Mental Disabilities, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 589, 593 (2008) 
[hereinafter Look Inside Your Mirror] (citing, in part, Robert P. Schuwerk, The Law Profes-
sor as Fiduciary: What Duties Do We Owe to Our Students, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 753, 764 
(2004)). 
13  See, e.g., Steven R. Smith, From Law and Bananas to Real Law: A Celebration of Schol-
arship in Mental Health Law, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 1 (1997) (criticizing this attitude). 
14  Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Education: Professional Interests and Public Values, 34 IND. L. 
REV. 23, 37 (2000). 
15  Arthur Austin, The Alchemy of Promotion and Tenure, 75 DENVER U. L. REV. 1, 5 (1997). 
16  One of the authors (MLP) has written multiple articles using TJ principles in the areas of 
criminal procedure and international human rights law, for example. Perhaps not insignifi-
cantly, many of his co-authors of the articles cited infra are forensic psychologists and litiga-
tors, not law professors. See, e.g., Astrid Birgden & Michael L. Perlin, ‘Tolling for the Luck-
less, the Abandoned and Forsaked’: Therapeutic Jurisprudence and International Human 
Rights Law As Applied to Prisoners and Detainees by Forensic Psychologists, 13 LEGAL & 
CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 231, 234–38 (2008); Astrid Birgden & Michael L. Perlin, 
“Where the Home in the Valley Meets the Damp Dirty Prison”: A Human Rights Perspective 
on Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Role of Forensic Psychologists in Correctional Set-
tings, 14 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 256, 257–58 (2009); Michael L. Perlin & Henry 
A. Dlugacz, “It’s Doom Alone that Counts”: Can International Human Rights Law Be an 
Effective Source of Rights in Correctional Conditions Litigation?, 27 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 675, 
691–94 (2009). See generally Michael L. Perlin, “Striking for the Guardians and Protectors 
of the Mind”: The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities and the Fu-
ture of Guardianship Law, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 1159 (2013) [hereinafter Striking]; Michael 
L. Perlin & Valerie McClain, “Where Souls Are Forgotten”: Cultural Competencies, Foren-
sic Evaluations, and International Human Rights, 15 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 257 (2009); 
Michael L. Perlin, “Yonder Stands Your Orphan with His Gun”: The International Human 
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can lead students to more rewarding careers, both personally and socially. This 
article will consider these principles in the specific context of teaching and 
writing about sexuality and disability—a topic that has always been seen as 
“beyond the last frontier”17—as a case example of the use of TJ. 
 This article’s basic thesis is that teaching TJ is a tool of social justice that 
can (1) help remediate traditional methods of law school teaching that have 
consistently led to apathy, depression, and anomie among students who learn—
both implicitly and explicitly—that justice does not matter much in the process 
of teaching or learning law; (2) lead students to think critically and creatively 
about the range of social problems that are often ignored in traditional law 
school teaching; and (3) bring a sharp focus on a totally under-considered top-
ic—the sexual autonomy rights of institutionalized persons with mental disabil-
ities—in a way that may bring about important and emancipatory social 
change, possibly leading students to consider a career representing persons with 
such disabilities. 
 The article will proceed in the following manner. First, Part I gives a short 
overview of therapeutic jurisprudence. Then, Part II discusses New York Law 
School’s course, Survey of Mental Disability Law (a course that MLP has 
taught, in multiple iterations, since 1985), its coverage, and student reactions to 
different topics presented.18 Part III considers how a TJ-based discussion of 
sexuality can sharpen students’ understanding of the underlying issues, and 
building on that discussion, how those insights have informed both authors’ 
scholarly writing on this substantive topic and AJL’s public interest practice on 
behalf of persons with disabilities. The article then offers a brief conclusion and 
some thoughts for the future. 
I. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE19 
 Therapeutic jurisprudence “asks us to look at law as it actually impacts 
people’s lives”20 and focuses on the law’s influence on emotional life and 
                                                                                                                                 
Rights and Therapeutic Jurisprudence Implications of Juvenile Punishment Schemes, 46 
TEX. TECH L. REV. 301 (2013). 
17  See generally Michael L. Perlin, Hospitalized Patients and the Right to Sexual Interac-
tion: Beyond the Last Frontier?, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC’L CHANGE 517 (1993–94) [here-
inafter Hospitalized Patients]. 
18  New York Law School also offers a stand-alone course in Therapeutic Jurisprudence. See, 
e.g., Michael L. Perlin, “They Keep It All Hid”: The Ghettoization of Mental Disability Law 
and Its Implications for Legal Education, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 857, 870 nn.58–59 (2010) 
[hereinafter They Keep It All Hid]. 
19  Much of this section is adapted from Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, “Love Is Just a 
Four-Letter Word”: Sexuality, International Human Rights, and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 
1 CANADIAN J. COMPARATIVE & CONTEMPORARY L. 9 (2015). 
 20  Bruce J. Winick, Foreword: Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspectives on Dealing with 
Victims of Crime, 33 NOVA L. REV. 535, 535 (2009). 
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psychological well-being.21 It suggests that “law should value psychological 
health, should strive to avoid imposing anti-therapeutic consequences whenever 
possible, and when consistent with other values served by law, should attempt 
to bring about healing and wellness.”22 “The ultimate aim of therapeutic 
jurisprudence is to determine whether legal rules, procedures, and lawyer roles 
can or should be reshaped to enhance their therapeutic potential while not 
subordinating due process principles.”23  
 There is an inherent tension in this inquiry, but David Wexler clearly 
identifies how it must be resolved: The law’s use of “mental health information 
to improve therapeutic functioning [cannot] imping[e] upon justice concerns.”24 
As one of the authors has written elsewhere, “an inquiry into therapeutic 
outcomes does not mean that therapeutic concerns ‘trump’ civil rights and civil 
liberties.”25 In its aim to use the law to empower individuals, enhance rights, 
and promote well-being, TJ has been described as “a sea-change in ethical 
thinking about the role of law . . . a movement towards a more distinctly rela-
tional approach to the practice of law . . . which emphasi[zes] psychological 
wellness over adversarial triumphalism.”26 That is, TJ supports an “ethic of 
care.”27 
                                                        
 21  See David B. Wexler, Practicing Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Psycholegal Soft Spots and 
Strategies, in PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A HELPING PROFESSION 45, 
45 (Dennis P. Stolle et al. eds., 2000). 
 22  Bruce J. Winick, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Model for Civil Commitment, in 
INVOLUNTARY DETENTION AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 
ON CIVIL COMMITMENT 23, 26 (Kate Diesfeld & Ian Freckelton eds., 2003). 
 23  Striking, supra note 16, at 1184; accord Michael L. Perlin, “And My Best Friend, My 
Doctor/Won’t Even Say What It Is I’ve Got”: The Role and Significance of Counsel in Right 
to Refuse Treatment Cases, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735, 751 (2005) [hereinafter Best Friend]; 
Michael L. Perlin, “Everybody Is Making Love/Or Else Expecting Rain”: Considering the 
Sexual Autonomy Rights of Persons Institutionalized Because of Mental Disability in Foren-
sic Hospitals and in Asia, 83 WASH. L. REV. 481, 510 n.139 (2008) [hereinafter Expecting 
Rain]; see also Ian Freckelton, Therapeutic Jurisprudence Misunderstood and Misrepresent-
ed: The Price and Risks of Influence, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 575, 585–86 (2008); Look 
Inside Your Mirror, supra note 12, at 591 (discussing how TJ “might be a redemptive tool in 
efforts to combat sanism, as a means of ‘stripping bare the law’s sanist façade’ ”); Bernard P. 
Perlmutter, George’s Story: Voice and Transformation Through the Teaching and Practice 
of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in a Law School Child Advocacy Clinic, 17 ST. THOMAS L. 
REV. 561, 599 n.111 (2005). 
 24  David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Changing Conceptions of Legal Schol-
arship, 11 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 17, 21 (1993). See generally David B. Wexler, Applying the 
Law Therapeutically, 5 APPLIED & PREVENTIVE PSYCHOL. 179 (1996). 
 25  Michael L. Perlin, A Law of Healing, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 407, 412 (2000); Michael L. Per-
lin, “Where the Winds Hit Heavy on the Borderline”: Mental Disability Law, Theory and 
Practice, “Us” and “Them,” 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 775, 782 (1998). 
 26  Warren Brookbanks, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Conceiving an Ethical Framework, 8 
J.L. & MED. 328, 329–30 (2001); see also Bruce J. Winick, Overcoming Psychological Bar-
riers to Settlement: Challenges for the TJ Lawyer, in THE AFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL: PRACTICING LAW AS A HEALING PROFESSION 341, 341 (Marjorie A. Silver ed., 
2007); Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler, The Use of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Law 
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 One of the central principles of TJ is a commitment to dignity.28 Professor 
Amy Ronner stresses the importance of the “three Vs” as voice, validation, and 
voluntariness,29 arguing: 
What “the three Vs” commend is pretty basic: litigants must have a sense of 
voice or a chance to tell their story to a decision maker. If that litigant feels that 
the tribunal has genuinely listened to, heard, and taken seriously the litigant’s 
story, the litigant feels a sense of validation. When litigants emerge from a legal 
proceeding with a sense of voice and validation, they are more at peace with the 
outcome. Voice and validation create a sense of voluntary participation, one in 
which the litigant experiences the proceeding as less coercive. Specifically, the 
feeling on the part of litigants that they voluntarily partook in the very process 
that engendered the end result or the very judicial pronunciation that affects their 
own lives can initiate healing and bring about improved behavior in the future. 
In general, human beings prosper when they feel that they are making, or at least 
participating in, their own decisions.30 
The question to be addressed here is this: given the way we deny the sexu-
ality rights of persons with disabilities,31 is it remotely possible that Professor 
Ronner’s vision of voice, voluntariness, and validation will be fulfilled? Think 
about some of the ways that a radical change in the way we treat persons with 
disabilities in matters of sexuality can comply with TJ values. In a thoughtful 
analysis of the underlying issues, Professors Julie Tennille and Eric Wright  
have listed multiple benefits of a “communicative climate” for consumers with 
regard to sexuality issues.32 Professors Janine Benedet and Isabel Grant have 
                                                                                                                                 
School Clinical Education: Transforming the Criminal Law Clinic, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 
605, 605–06 (2006). 
 27  See, e.g., Gregory Baker, Do You Hear the Knocking at the Door? A “Therapeutic” Ap-
proach to Enriching Clinical Legal Education Comes Calling, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 379, 
385 (2006); Brookbanks, supra note 26; David B. Wexler, Not Such a Party Pooper: An At-
tempt to Accommodate (Many of) Professor Quinn’s Concerns About Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence Criminal Defense Lawyering, 48 B.C. L. REV. 597, 599 (2007); Winick & Wexler, 
supra note 26, at 605–07. The use of the phrase dates to CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT 
VOICE (1982). 
 28  See BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL 161 
(2005). 
 29  Amy D. Ronner, The Learned-Helpless Lawyer: Clinical Legal Education and Therapeu-
tic Jurisprudence as Antidotes to Bartleby Syndrome, 24 TOURO L. REV. 601, 627 (2008). On 
the importance of “voice,” see Freckelton, supra note 23, at 588. 
 30  Amy D. Ronner, Songs of Validation, Voice, and Voluntary Participation: Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence, Miranda and Juveniles, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 89, 94–95 (2002) (footnotes omit-
ted). 
31  See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN & ALISON J. LYNCH, SEXUALITY, DISABILITY AND THE 
LAW: BEYOND THE LAST FRONTIER? (forthcoming Jan. 2016); Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. 
Lynch, “All His Sexless Patients”: Persons with Mental Disabilities and the Competence to 
Have Sex, 89 WASH. L. REV. 257 (2014). 
32  See Julie Tennille & Eric Wright, Addressing the Intimacy Interests of People with Mental 
Health Conditions: Acknowledging Consumer Desires, Provider Discomforts, and System 
Denial, TEMPLE UNIV. COLLABORATIVE ON CMTY. INCLUSION OF INDIVIDUALS WITH 
PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES 13–14 (2013), http://tucollaborative.org/pdfs/Toolkits_Mono 
graphs_Guidebooks/relationships_family_friends_intimacy/intimacy.pdf. 
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also used a therapeutic jurisprudential filter in weighing these issues, and have 
considered how to define “capacity to consent” and “engage in sexual activi-
ties,” and how to ensure that such definitions remain person-centered and allow 
for a “situational approach” to each case.33 They write that “incapacity can and 
should be defined situationally—in a functional manner that maximizes [a per-
son’s] sexual self-determination.”34 However, Benedet and Grant’s thoughtful 
analysis and emphasis on the individual and self-determination—two concepts 
linked with dignity35—have not been greatly expanded upon in case law or leg-
islation so as to give life to the therapeutic jurisprudential lens that they employ 
to view these issues of sexuality.  
Over twenty years ago, one of us (MLP) wrote the following about sexuali-
ty issues in the domestic context, and we believe that little has changed in the 
intervening two decades: 
We must also question the therapeutic or antitherapeutic implications of official 
hospital policies that control the place, manner, and frequency with which such 
individuals can have sexual interactions. We must consider the implications of 
these policies on ward life and their implications for patients’ post-hospital lives. 
These questions are difficult ones, but we must ask them nonetheless if we wish 
to formulate a thoughtful, comprehensive response to the wide range of ques-
tions this subject raises.36 
                                                                                                                                 
• Healthy sexual relationships can foster development and maintenance of new rela-
tionships, a key element in social integration;  
• Positive sexual partnerships can increase quality of life, and those with mental health 
conditions who maintain relationships often have better treatment outcomes;  
• Some research indicates that hospital readmission rates dropped if consumers were 
able to develop romantic relationships; and 
• Stigma of mental illness may be reduced.  
Id. (citations omitted). 
33  Janine Benedet & Isabel Grant, A Situational Approach to Incapacity and Mental Disabil-
ity in Sexual Assault Law, 43 OTTAWA L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2011–13). 
34  Id. at 4. 
35  On the role of dignity in mental disability law in general, see MICHAEL L. PERLIN, A 
PRESCRIPTION FOR DIGNITY: RETHINKING CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND MENTAL DISABILITY LAW 
(2013). On its role in therapeutic jurisprudence, see, for example, WINICK, supra note 28; 
Claire B. Steinberger, Persistence and Change in the Life of the Law: Can Therapeutic Ju-
risprudence Make a Difference?, 27 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 55, 64 (2003) (describing TJ’s fo-
cus on psychological and social outcomes as including “feelings of dignity and self-worth”). 
36  Hospitalized Patients, supra note 17, at 547. On the range of therapeutic jurisprudence-
related issues that are related in general to institutional decision-making in matters involving 
sexual autonomy and issues of hospital security, see Expecting Rain, supra note 23. On the 
TJ questions related to hospital security questions in general, see Michael L. Perlin & Alison 
J. Lynch, “Toiling in the Danger and in the Morals of Despair”: Risk, Security, Danger, the 
Constitution, and the Clinician’s Dilemma, 27 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. ( forthcoming 2016). 
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II. TEACHING MENTAL DISABILITY LAW 
New York Law School has offered thirteen courses as part of a blended 
online mental disability law curriculum.37 The “gateway” course is Survey of 
Mental Disability Law, a course that seeks to provide “a comprehensive look at 
many of the issues that will be considered at greater length in the more special-
ized classes, and provides the basic doctrines fundamental to the understanding 
of mental disability law.”38 This course covers civil commitment, institutional 
rights (including the right to treatment, the right to refuse treatment, the right to 
sexual interaction, and others), deinstitutionalization, aftercare, federal statuto-
ry rights (with specific focus on the Americans with Disabilities Act), and the 
role of mental disability in the criminal trial process (including criminal incom-
petencies, insanity defense, federal sentencing guidelines, and the death penal-
ty).39 All topics are taught from multiple theoretical perspectives; on the first 
day, students are taught the meaning of sanism, and how it infects the entire le-
gal process and the legal academy.40 It is often new to students, but generally 
they reflect understanding via a discussion of sanist myths, parallels to other 
“isms,” in the context of case and lawyering examples.41 This is closely fol-
lowed by explanations of pretextuality,42 the way that heuristic thinking con-
taminates this area of law,43 the role of false “ordinary common sense,”44 and, 
as a vehicle through which to integrate all the other material, the meaning of 
                                                        
37  They Keep It All Hid, supra note 18, at 865–71 (listing all courses). 
38  Id. at 870 n.58. 
39  Id. 
40  Sanism is an “irrational prejudice of the same quality and character of other irrational 
prejudices that cause (and are reflected in) prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism, 
homophobia, and ethnic bigotry.” Id. at 860–61; see Michael L. Perlin, On “Sanism,” 46 
SMU L. REV. 373, 374–75 (1992). 
41  See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL 
(2000) (ways that both lawyers and judges discount and trivialize the experiences of persons 
with mental illness); see also Best Friend, supra note 23, at 738 (discussing the paternalism 
omnipresent in decisions that are made ostensibly on behalf of persons with mental illness). 
42  “Pretextuality defines the ways in which courts accept (either implicitly or explicitly) tes-
timonial dishonesty and engage similarly in dishonest (and frequently meretricious) deci-
sion-making. In many cases, courts allow witnesses, especially expert witnesses, to purpose-
ly distort their testimony in order to achieve desired ends.” Michael L. Perlin, “Simplify You, 
Classify You”: Stigma, Stereotypes and Civil Rights in Disability Classification Systems, 25 
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 607, 621 (2009). 
43  “ ‘Heuristics’ is a cognitive psychology construct that refers to the implicit thinking de-
vices that individuals use to simplify complex, information-processing tasks.” Michael L. 
Perlin, The Sanist Lives of Jurors in Death Penalty Cases: The Puzzling Role of “Mitigat-
ing” Mental Disability Evidence, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 239, 254 (1994). 
44  “[O]rdinary common sense” is a “ ‘prereflective attitude’ exemplified by the attitude of 
‘What I know is “self-evident”; it is “what everybody knows.” ’ ” Keri K. Gould & Michael 
L. Perlin, “Johnny’s in the Basement/Mixing Up His Medicine”: Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
and Clinical Teaching, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 339, 357 (2000) (citing Richard K. Sherwin, 
Dialects and Dominance: A Study of Rhetorical Fields in the Law of Confessions, 136 U. PA. 
L. REV. 729, 737 (1988)). 
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therapeutic jurisprudence. The “bottom line” remains this: “All aspects of men-
tal disability law are pervaded by sanism and by pretextuality, whether the spe-
cific presenting topic is involuntary civil commitment law, right to refuse 
treatment law, the sexual rights of persons with mental disabilities, or any as-
pect of the criminal trial process.”45 
 There are sometimes some bumps in the course of teaching the right-to-
refuse-treatment unit as the result of the vividness heuristic46 at work (e.g., “But 
what about that creepy guy on the subway this morning?” and/or “Professor, 
you never met my brother-in-law, who . . .”), but they abate as students learn 
about the case law and the reasons it arose (focusing on the pervasiveness of 
toxic side effects revealed in institutional drugging cases, and how, institution-
ally, medication is often used as a means of social control rather than as treat-
ment).47 Even in the discussions of the insanity defense, when students learn 
how the common wisdom (as to rate of the plea being used, success rates, dis-
positions, and malingering) is all wrong,48 they recognize that they previously 
had fallen prey to the power of the vividness heuristic.49 But, notwithstanding 
these attitudinal changes, the only topic receiving a “what are you, kidding?” 
response comes when the discussion turns—in the unit on “other institutional 
rights”—to the right of institutionalized patients to sexual autonomy.50 
 This is, to many students, again, beyond the last frontier. The notion that 
patients have such a right—and that this right may be found in some state pa-
tients’ bills of rights51 and may be further supported by ADA-based argu-
                                                        
45  Best Friend, supra note 23 (emphasis added). 
46  The vividness heuristic is the cognitive-simplifying device through which a “single vivid, 
memorable case overwhelms mountains of abstract, colorless data upon which rational 
choices should be made.” Michael L. Perlin, “The Borderline Which Separated You from 
Me”: The Insanity Defense, the Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear of Faking, and the Culture of 
Punishment, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1375, 1417 (1997). 
47  See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, The ADA and Persons with Mental Disabilities: Can Sanist 
Attitudes Be Undone?, 8 J.L. & HEALTH 15, 43 n.163 (1993–94) (discussing how, in the lead 
right-to-refuse involuntary medication case of Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294, 1299 
(D.N.J. 1979) (establishing broad constitutionally-based right to refuse antipsychotic drug 
treatment), the “medical director of defendant institution acknowledged that medication was 
used ‘as a form of control and as a substitute for treatment’ ”). 
48  See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1994). 
49  See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, “His Brain Has Been Mismanaged with Great Skill”: How 
Will Jurors Respond to Neuroimaging Testimony in Insanity Defense Cases?, 42 AKRON L. 
REV. 885, 903 (2009). 
50  This attitude similarly prevails in student responses in the course on Sex Offenders, where 
the vast majority of students enter that class with the idée fixe that the television series, Law 
and Order: SVU, is 100 percent right about everything, failing to acknowledge that this may 
not be the whole story. On media contamination of public attitudes towards sex offender liti-
gation and legislation in general, see, for example, Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. Per-
lin, “They’re Planting Stories in the Press”: The Impact of Media Distortions on Sex Of-
fender Law and Policy, 3 U. DENV. CRIM. L. REV. 185, 217 (2013). 
51  Hospitalized Patients, supra note 17, at 530. 
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ments52—strikes many students as incredulous.53 It is stressed that their re-
sponses are textbook examples of sanism, but usually to no avail. But then, 
when they are reminded of Professor Amy Ronner’s “three Vs,” sometimes 
(just sometimes) there is some acceptance of the idea.54  
 Sanism has always pervaded the entire legal academy: 
Last year, I was sitting at my faculty lunch table, and conversation turned to 
upcoming presentations that we would soon be doing. My colleagues mostly 
take left-liberal positions on a wide variety of issues, and are generically the ex-
act mix of retro ’60s generationists and early baby boomers that you’d expect. 
They (appropriately) are quick to criticize any behavior that is racist, sexist, eth-
nically bigoted or homophobic. Rush Limbaugh would probably view them as 
one of his worst “politically correct” horror fantasies. As you might expect, I’m 
not terribly out of place in this group . . . . 
Anyway, when it got to be my turn, I said that I was going to be speaking 
about the right of institutionalized mentally disabled persons to sexual interac-
tion. All conversation came to a screeching halt. 
“Michael, are you serious?” “Are you crazy (sic)?” “Michael, even for you, 
you’ve gone too far!” “What are you going to say next: that they can get mar-
ried?!?” Et cetera.55 
 Although there are very few topics that remain taboo or off-limits to legal 
scholars, discussions of the question of whether persons with mental disabilities 
have a right to voluntary sexual interaction continues to touch a raw nerve in 
conversations about mental disability law—even with those who are practicing 
in the field. Why is this? In prior articles, we have explored this remarkable 
state of events. We discussed it in a recent article in the context of sanism, and 
we think it is necessary to keep this in mind as part of this conversation: 
If as I saw it, sanist myths, based on stereotypes, are the result of rigid 
categorization and overgeneralization, then they function psychological-
ly to “localize our anxiety, to prove to ourselves that what we fear does 
not lie within.” 
                                                        
52  See Michael L. Perlin, “Make Promises by the Hour”: Sex, Drugs, the ADA, and Psychi-
atric Hospitalization, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 947, 947–48 (1997). 
53  A careful body-language observer would quickly pick this up. 
54  Responses to grand rounds presentations that were done at hospitals and medical schools 
about these sexual rights have been startling. Perlin & Lynch, supra note 31, at 258–61, 259 
n.7.  
When [MLP] gave this talk at the Florida Institute of Mental Health (part of the University 
of South Florida in Tampa), an audience member (from the general public) leapt to his feet, and 
denounced [him]: “Professor Perlin, you are an agent of the devil!” At a New York City hospital 
presentation, a nurse folded her arms across her chest, and announced, “Professor, you are the 
very embodiment of evil!” 
Michael L. Perlin, “Limited in Sex, They Dare”: Attitudes Toward Issues of Patient Sexuali-
ty, 26 AMER. J. FORENS. PSYCHIATRY 25, 36 (2005) (recounting these and other examples). 
We discuss these issues extensively in PERLIN & LYNCH, supra note 31. 
55  Michael L. Perlin, “You Have Discussed Lepers and Crooks”: Sanism in Clinical Teach-
ing, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 683, 714 (2003). 
16 NEV. L.J. 209, PERLIN & LYNCH - FINAL.DOCX 1/15/16  8:25 PM 
Fall 2015] THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 219 
We thus labeled individuals with mental illness as “deviant, morally weak, 
sexually uncontrollable and emotionally unstable.” And often, we (especially 
professionals) regard them as not being human at all, and lacking human quali-
ties including needs for affection and dignified ways of expressing affection. 
Our attitudes toward the sexuality of persons with mental disabilities reflect this 
labeling: 
Society tends to infantilize the sexual urges, desires, and needs of the 
mentally disabled. Alternatively, they are regarded as possessing an an-
imalistic hypersexuality, which warrants the imposition of special pro-
tections and limitations on their sexual behavior to stop them from act-
ing on these “primitive” urges. By focusing on alleged “differentness,” 
we deny their basic humanity and their shared physical, emotional, and 
spiritual needs. By asserting that theirs is a primitive morality, we allow 
ourselves to censor their feelings and their actions. By denying their 
ability to show love and affection, we justify this disparate treatment.56 
III. TEACHING SEXUALITY THROUGH A THERAPEUTIC  
JURISPRUDENCE FILTER 
A. From the Perspective of a Teacher 
For the week in the Survey of Mental Disability Law course in which the 
right to sexual interaction is taught, students are given these learning objec-
tives: 
• Understand how courts and legislatures have construed one of the most 
controversial aspects of institutional patients’ rights law. 
• Recognize how our response to questions of disability and sexuality il-
luminates many of the underlying attitudinal issues that shape mental 
disability law policy. 
• Identify “incredible dilemmas” (apparently irresolvable policy con-
flicts) that may be raised in institutional patients’ rights inquiries.57  
In addition, they are presented with three “directed study questions” that will, 
to an important extent, be the focus of that week’s class discussion: 
• What are the larger implications of the public’s use of contradictory 
stereotypes in its consideration of issues of patient sexuality? 
• Why do you think there has been so little litigation in this area of the 
law? 
• Imagine that Foy v. Greenblott58 had been appealed to the California 
Supreme Court, and that you were a judge on that court at that time. 
How would you have decided that case on further appeal?59  
                                                        
56  Perlin & Lynch, supra note 31, at 259–60 (footnotes omitted). 
57  Michael L. Perlin, Survey of Mental Disability Law Course Webpage Syllabus (Fall 
2015) (copy on file with author). 
58  190 Cal. Rptr. 84, 91 (Ct. App. 1983) (institutionalized patient’s right to engage in volun-
tary sexual relations required that she be afforded suitable opportunities for interactions with 
members of the opposite sex); see Hospitalized Patients, supra note 17, at 532–33. 
59  See Perlin, supra note 57. 
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These issues are all discussed in class through the filter of therapeutic jurispru-
dence. Students also consider a variety of other substantive questions about 
sexuality and disability law in the same manner. Depending on the semester, 
these questions may include the following: 
• “Does it make a difference if we are discussing monogamous het-
erosexual sex, polygamous heterosexual sex, monogamous homo-
sexual sex, polygamous homosexual sex, or bisexual sex?”60 
• “Should erotic or pornographic material be made available to pa-
tients?”61 
• “Should a patient’s decision to engage in what is sometimes per-
ceived as ‘deviant’ sexual behavior subsequently be used as evi-
dence of their danger either to self or others or of ‘grave disabil-
ity’?”62 
• “How should ‘competency’ be assessed in the context of patients’ 
ability to consent to sexual activity?”63 
• “To what extent are international human rights instruments of sig-
nificance in assessing the extent to which institutionalized patients 
can exercise a right to sexual autonomy?”64 
In each of these instances, students are asked to consider—through a therapeu-
tic jurisprudence filter—whether persons with mental disabilities are given au-
thentic autonomy in their sexual decision-making and whether Professor 
Ronner’s “three Vs,” discussed earlier,65 are complied with.  
                                                        
60  Perlin & Lynch, supra note 31, at 265. 
61  Id. 
62  Id. See generally Michael L. Commons et al., Professionals’ Attitudes Towards Sex Be-
tween Institutionalized Patients, 46 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 571 (1992) (discussing ways that 
mental health professionals’ attitudes towards sex are influenced by the nature of the sexual 
activity and the patients’ sexual orientation). 
63  Perlin & Lynch, supra note 31, at 263 (discussing full range of issues to be considered in 
this context).  
The most important recent developments have come in the case of Kortner v. Martise, 91 
A.3d 412 (Conn. 2014). In Kortner, the plaintiff, administratrix of the estate of her daughter 
(the alleged victim [Kendall] and a person with mental disabilities) filed a complaint against 
a defendant for sexual battery, civil assault, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
stemming from a sadomasochistic sexual relationship that developed between victim and 
defendant, argued that her daughter had been legally unable to consent to sexual conduct. Id. 
at 412, 445. The court rejected this position, concluding that it was a “factual question for 
the jury to decide based on the nature of the particular conservatorship and the abilities of the 
conserved person,” and noting that conservatorships need to be exercised via the “least intru-
sive means available by which the individual’s affairs can be handled.” Id. at 445; accord 2 
MICHAEL L. PERLIN & HEATHER ELLIS CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND 
CRIMINAL § 3C–5.1 n.251 (2d ed. Supp. 2014). 
64  Perlin & Lynch, supra note 31, at 273–77. 
65  See supra notes 28–33 and accompanying text. 
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B. From the Perspective of a Former Student 
 A central question for legal educators has been whether law schools can 
teach their students to “do good.”66 Further, scholars ask, should schools feel as 
if they must impress upon students the importance of social justice work?67 
Marginalized groups, like those with a mental disability,68 are not highlighted 
as needing legal assistance and are not made a priority. The American Bar As-
sociation supports the promotion of public interest work. In its Commission on 
Professionalism report, it wrote “[t]he practice of law ‘in the spirit of a public 
service’ can and ought to be the hallmark of the legal profession.”69 However, 
this endorsement of public service has, by and large, not made it to law schools. 
The culture of legal education, especially at a time when economic success for 
graduates is so highly relevant, and job placement statistics are so carefully 
scrutinized by law blogs and the popular legal press,70 does not promote public 
interest work.71 
 Some legal educators may feel that if a student has not developed “the ide-
alism, the willingness to forego financial rewards and social respectability, and 
the commitment to social justice that motivate and sustain lawyers” who 
choose careers in public interest, no amount of encouragement from a law 
school will instill this.72 However, this is simply not the case, nor is there any 
valid or reliable empirical evidence supporting it. It is unreasonable to believe 
that students cannot be motivated to pursue careers in public interest once they 
attend law school and see firsthand the need for such services. To imply that 
students cannot be motivated by what they experience in the classroom, in clin-
ical work, and in internships is to conclude that no amount of encouragement 
by professors and administrators can get students into public interest careers. 
                                                        
66  Stephen Wizner, Can Law Schools Teach Students to Do Good? Legal Education and the 
Future of Legal Services for the Poor, 3 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 259, 259 (2000). 
67  Id. at 259–60. 
68  See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin & John Douard, “Equality, I Spoke That Word/As if a Wed-
ding Vow”: Mental Disability Law and How We Treat Marginalized Persons, 53 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 9, 10 (2008–09). See generally Michael L. Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionali-
zation, and Homelessness: A Story of Marginalization, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 63 (1991). 
69  ABA COMM’N ON PROFESSIONALISM, “. . . . IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE:” A 
BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM 10 (1986). 
70  See generally Jeff Schmitt, Law Schools Where Grads Actually Get Jobs, TIPPING THE 
SCALES (Mar. 13, 2014), http://tippingthescales.com/2014/03/law-schools-where-grads-get-
jobs; Jordan Weissmann, The Jobs Crisis at Our Best Law Schools Is Much, Much Worse 
than You Think, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 9, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive 
/2013/04/the-jobs-crisis-at-our-best-law-schools-is-much-much-worse-than-you-
think/274795; Staci Zaretsky, Which Law Schools Employed the Most Graduates As Real 
Lawyers Versus Real Baristas, ABOVE THE LAW (Mar. 27, 2013, 1:09 PM), 
http://abovethelaw.com/2013/03/which-law-schools-employed-the-most-graduates-as-real-
lawyers-versus-real-baristas. 
71  Jill Chaifetz, The Value of Public Service: A Model for Instilling a Pro Bono Ethic in Law 
School, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1695, 1697 (1993). 
72  Wizner, supra note 66, at 260. 
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That conclusion is a disservice to legal pedagogy. Rather than conclude that 
students have a predetermined career path upon entering law school, professors 
and administrators need to recognize their potential for impact, and create a 
culture and classroom pedagogy that support their goals of directing students 
toward meaningful public interest careers. 
 The task of reforming current legal pedagogy and teaching law students 
how to “do good” may seem daunting, but tools in the fields of social justice 
and public interest already exist, such as clinics and other experiential cours-
es,73 courses on professional responsibility,74 and therapeutic jurisprudence.75 
TJ is a powerful teaching tool because it combines law’s known qualities, and 
inherent power imbalances, with the need to recognize those qualities and adapt 
them to create a therapeutic benefit for the client.76  
 Therapeutic jurisprudence, in particular, can also be integrated into the cur-
riculums of many existing classes, even including the core classes that students 
must complete in their first year.77 TJ transcends many topics of law, and 
should not be limited to use when discussing only cases involving mental disa-
bility.78 TJ can be an important tool in family law, criminal law, wills and trusts 
law, gay rights law, torts law, and others.79 This provides multiple opportunities 
for professors across the substantive disciplines to teach TJ principles and cli-
ent-centered lawyering. Connecting and empathizing with a client will only 
help to create a feeling of connectedness between a law student and the indi-
viduals she may have the opportunity to represent in her career. Making stu-
                                                        
73  Fran Quigley, Seizing the Disorienting Moment: Adult Learning Theory and the Teaching 
of Social Justice in Law School Clinics, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 37, 38 (1995); Antoinette Sedil-
lo Lopez, Learning Through Service in a Clinical Setting: The Effect of Specialization on 
Social Justice and Skills Training, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 307, 308 (2001); Stephen Wizner & 
Jane Aiken, Teaching and Doing: The Role of Law School Clinics in Enhancing Access to 
Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 997, 997 (2004). 
74  See Tanina Rostain, Ethics Lost: Limitations of Current Approaches to Lawyer Regula-
tion, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1273, 1274 (1998). 
75  See Perlin & Douard, supra note 68, at 14 (“The use of TJ—as a tool for the exposure of 
these hoaxes and as a mechanism for advancing social justice is a way (perhaps the only 
way) to redeem the law for persons who have been marginalized.”). 
76  On the relationship between TJ and power imbalances, see, for example, Jamie Balson, 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Facilitating Healing in Crime Victims, 6 PHOENIX L. REV. 1017, 
1024 (2013). 
77  Indeed, David Wexler, one of the founders of TJ, has been focusing on this precise point 
in his recent scholarship. See, e.g., Dennis P. Stolle et al., Integrating Preventive Law and 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence: A Law and Psychology Based Approach to Lawyering, 34 CAL. 
W. L. REV. 15, 49 (1997); David B. Wexler, The International and Interdisciplinary Project 
to Mainstream Therapeutic Jurisprudence (TJ) in Criminal Courts: An Update, a Law 
School Component, and an Invitation, in ESSAYS ON THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE IN NEW 
ZEALAND (Warren Brookbanks ed., 2015 forthcoming), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=2399914. 
78  Elizabeth F. Schwartz, Book Review, Practicing Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Law As a 
Helping Profession, 76 FLA. B.J., Jan. 2002, at 66, 66. 
79  See Michael L. Perlin, “Things Have Changed:” Looking at Non-Institutional Mental 
Disability Law Through the Sanism Filter, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 535, 543–45 (2003). 
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dents aware of the issues regarding access to justice and equality that exist, 
starting from their first-year core classes, will serve as a foundation for TJ 
teachings and discussions about strategies and goals for addressing these prob-
lems. Learning to give clients dignity, voice, and validation will be critical 
skills to developing the empathy that can lead students to choose to pursue ca-
reers in public interest law. Moreover, teaching about sexuality and disability in 
a therapeutic jurisprudence context is, to us, a perfect way of making these 
points. 
 Law schools will also need to take responsibility for proactively reforming 
and reshaping their curriculum and career planning.80 Integrating social justice 
and TJ values into the curriculum will set students up to continue their educa-
tion with these values in mind. These changes can be made in a practical man-
ner by focusing on what values students should be learning, and developing 
strategies to teach them. Professors can create new classes that delve into the 
problems facing marginalized groups, and the strategies lawyers can employ 
when representing them. Existing courses can be modified to include discus-
sions based on cases already assigned that highlight a social justice problem. 
 It is also important to recognize that students do not have to choose either 
public interest or private practice. There can be some of each, even for a stu-
dent who feels compelled to enter private practice as his or her primary career. 
Pro bono opportunities within firms, or through bar organizations, should be 
encouraged and highlighted by career offices at law schools when speaking 
with students about postgraduate plans.81 
Many law schools already teach the benefits of employing a client-centered 
approach to lawyering, so integrating TJ themes in this framework is not a dif-
ficult task.82 Classes that teach professional responsibility and ethics can also 
highlight the balancing necessary for adhering to the legal rules of conduct and 
ensuring that marginalized clients receive the best possible advocacy. Clinics 
can teach not only the theory, but the practical elements of public interest work, 
such as the strategies employed at pretrial hearings, the way to properly ques-
tion an expert during a commitment hearing, how to engage in a dialogue with 
a client in an incompetency or insanity case,83 and the evolving jurisprudence 
around sexual autonomy for individuals with mental disabilities. Exposure, ed-
ucation, and information can be “transformative” for students.84 
Law schools have a responsibility to teach students about not only the 
power of the law through legislation and judicial decisions, but also about the 
                                                        
80  Wizner, supra note 66, at 263. 
81  Id. at 266. 
82 See generally, Robert A. Baruch Bush, Mediation Skills and Client-Centered Lawyering: 
A New View of the Partnership, 19 CLINICAL L. REV. 429 (2013). 
83  See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, “Too Stubborn to Ever Be Governed By Enforced Insanity”: 
Some Therapeutic Jurisprudence Dilemmas in the Representation of Criminal Defendants in 
Incompetency and Insanity Cases, 33 INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 475, 480 (2010). 
84  Wizner, supra note 66, at 264. 
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social responsibility that comes with exercising such power.85 Where groups of 
marginalized individuals are concerned, power often comes into play—for ex-
ample, the power to hold an indigent defendant without bail even though statis-
tically this all but ensures a worse case disposition,86 or the power to civilly 
commit an individual and deprive him of significant liberty interests.87 Law 
students need to be made aware of these injustices that exist in the law, and the 
power an attorney has to work to correct them.88 This power permeates the 
practice of law, and if taught appropriately, students can and should be encour-
aged to harness it to serve disadvantaged individuals.89 Learning through the 
use of therapeutic jurisprudence can help students recognize the inherent power 
imbalances in the law and combine their training to “think like lawyers”90 with 
the empathy and understanding that TJ promotes. 
One of us (AJL) is still relatively new to the practice of law, having gradu-
ated in 2013. While the law school culture at that time recognized the inherent 
value of public interest work, it was clear that the majority of students planned 
to enter private practice. Classes that integrated social justice issues and teach-
ings from TJ were beginning to be implemented and, more importantly, were 
beginning to draw interest from students who had jobs in the private sector, and 
though it is impossible to know how many career trajectories changed because 
of them, these courses at least reinforced the importance of public interest work 
and pro bono obligations. Additionally, students who took these classes will no 
doubt be more skilled, more empathetic, and better able to recognize the inher-
ent inequalities in the legal system, no matter what field they choose to enter. 
 Reforming and reshaping the way that public interest work is offered and 
presenting it as a viable career choice will be a crucial part of changing law 
school culture, even if some positive changes have begun (such as programs in 
mental disability law and other public interest fields). The use of therapeutic 
                                                        
85  For the classic work on the intersection between law and power, see Robert M. Cover, 
The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 
(1983). For a consideration, through a therapeutic jurisprudence perspective, of how the 
power of the law can shame and humiliate (drawing on Cover’s work), see Michael L. Perlin 
& Naomi M. Weinstein, “Friend to the Martyr, a Friend to the Woman of Shame”: Thinking 
About the Law, Shame, and Humiliation, 24 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 1 (2014). 
86  Gerald R. Wheeler & Carol L. Wheeler, Reflections on Legal Representation of the Eco-
nomically Disadvantaged: Beyond Assembly Line Justice, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 319, 319 
(1980). See generally Michael L. Perlin & Meredith R. Schriver, “You Might Have Drugs at 
Your Command”: Reconsidering the Forced Drugging of Incompetent Pre-trial Detainees 
from the Perspectives of International Human Rights and Income Inequality, 8 ALB. GOV’T 
L. REV. 381 (2015). 
87  Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982) (“Indeed, ‘liberty from bodily restraint 
always has been recognized as the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause 
from arbitrary governmental action.’ ”); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980). 
88  See Stephen Wizner, Rationing Justice, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 1019, 1025 (1997). 
89  See, e.g., Joel Haycock, Speaking Truth to Power: Rights, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, and 
Massachusetts Mental Health Law, 20 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 301, 318 
(1994). 
90  Wizner, supra note 66, at 261. 
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jurisprudence as a teaching tool—especially in the context of a subject matter 
as controversial and as stereotyped as the sexual autonomy rights of persons 
with mental disabilities—is an integral part of that reformation process. 
 CONCLUSION 
 We must change the prevailing model of legal education. We believe we 
have a duty to steer some students towards careers in public interest,91 and to 
reenergize all law students in their studies. TJ is a teaching tool that can 
effectively force students—while reading cases—to keep the client in mind, 
help them better connect with the material, and best hone their legal skills. This 
mandate fits perfectly, we believe, with the way that we teach sexuality and 
disability. 
 We teach about sexuality rights in our Survey of Mental Disability Law 
course, and in our Therapeutic Jurisprudence course. We do this because we 
believe it is essential that our students confront these difficult questions of au-
tonomy and social justice if they are to truly understand the deep textures of 
what they are studying. We also believe that the application of TJ values best 
illuminates the issues at hand. There is resistance on the part of many students 
(just as there is resistance on the part of faculty). But we will continue to articu-
late these views and to call out those whose sanism blinds them to the issues at 
hand. 
 There is some irony to be added. Some years ago, one of us (MLP) gave 
the keynote presentation at a SALT conference, and presented a paper titled, 
“Mental Disability, Sanism, Pretextuality, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, and 
Teaching Law.” The hostile response to the talk was appalling. In an article 
subsequently published in the SALT Equalizer, Professor Rogelio Lasso wrote 
that he “found it particularly disturbing that ‘Sane-ism’ merited a plenary 
presentation” at a SALT conference.92 Why should SALT be interested in this 
when there were so many other social justice issues to consider?93 Traditional 
progressive voices have been as equally hostile as have reactionary voices 
when it comes to the issues discussed in our article, and in our classes, and that 
AJL asserts in practice. We are hoping that, this time, the response will be 
somewhat different. 
 
 
                                                        
91  There has been little written about this topic. See, however, Richard F. Storrow & Patti 
Gearhart Turner, Where Equal Justice Begins: Mandatory Pro Bono in American Legal Ed-
ucation, 72 UMKC L. REV. 493, 498–99 (2003) (citing Professor Deborah Rhode, who has 
complained that although the majority of law school deans agree there is a duty to encourage 
students to perform pro bono later in their careers, most students do not participate in pro 
bono projects). 
92  Rogelio Lasso, Diversity Is As Diversity Does, SALT EQUALIZER, Dec. 1994, at 18, 18–
19. 
93  See id. 
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